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Abstract . Referring to Fustel de Coulanges’ distinction of urbs and civitas, 
the article discusses political theory and practice in 16th-17th-century Poland . 
While in western Europe an important shift in the notion of politics took 
place, and the civitas aspect of cities deteriorated as they were conquered 
by new centralized nation-states, the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth 
was an attempt to recreate the ancient and mediaeval concept of civitas – a 
community of free citizens, actively participating in the government – at the 
state level. As its proponents, such as Stanisław Sarnicki, argued, Poland 
was to become a city rather than a state, and so the theoretical justification, 
political practice, and eventual failure of this project is an interesting, though 
extreme, historical example of difficulties embedded in a more universal 
‘quest for the political form that would permit the gathering of the energies 
of the city while escaping the fate of the city’ (Manent 2013: 5) .
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Introduction
Political philosophers may feel reassured reading words of Lewis Mumford, who 
stated boldly that figures like Aristotle, Plato, and the utopian thinkers from Sir 
Thomas Moore to Robert Owen contributed more to answering the question ‘what 
is a city?’ than his fellow sociologists (Mumford 2011: 93) . Even more reassuring 
is the review of extensive sociological literature on the subject . The city is ‘an 
oeuvre, closer to a work of art than to a simple material product’ (Lefebvre 2000: 
101) . It is ‘something more than a congeries of individual men and of social 
conveniences’ (Park 2005: 1) because ‘social life is a structure of interaction, not 
a structure of stone, steel, cement, asphalt, etc .’ (Martindale 1958: 29) . ‘It is in 
the city, the city as theater, that man’s more purposive activities are focused, and 
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work out, through conflicting and cooperating personalities, events, groups, into 
more significant culminations’ (Mumford 2011: 94).
There is one repeatable element in all these definitions, as phrases like: ‘more 
than’, ‘rather than’, or ‘not only’ prove. All authors find it necessary to underline 
the fact that the city is a human creation, and thus any reliable explanation of 
the city experience must include intentional human action even if it is difficult 
to pin down this action by strictly scientific analysis. The city itself is involved 
in the vital processes of the people who compose it; it is a product of nature, 
and particularly of human ‘nature’, summarizes Park (2005: 1) . And since any 
discussion on human nature includes philosophical assumptions, it looks like 
political philosophers are indeed called to complement studies on cities with 
their more general and synthetizing narrative on the very essence of a city .
In effect, scholars interested in urban reality struggle not only with cities but 
also with ‘the city’; the latter having not only descriptive but also normative 
content . Cities have their particular names, they belong to particular times and 
spaces, they tell their particular stories . At the same time, there is a continuous 
interest in ‘the city’ meant as a concept which would become a theoretical 
benchmark according to which successes and failures of urbanization, being 
judged and predicted, could be measured . And so the worldwide historical city 
experience is still a valid political lesson .
This dual nature of a city is reflected, for instance, in Fustel de Coulanges’ 
distinction . The author of La Cité antique described ancient cities as being 
syntheses of urbs and civitas; the former being ‘the place of assembly, the 
dwelling-place, and […] the sanctuary’, while the latter: ‘the religious and political 
association of families and tribes’ (Fustel de Coulanges 1877: 177) . Both terms 
are convenient labels, and their possible application goes beyond the specific 
context of the ancient city-states . Regardless of time and space, particular cities 
can be viewed as places providing their inhabitants with opportunities to create 
their own civitas – ‘the city’ . The urbs side of cities is to a large extent historical 
and therefore easier to explore with scientific scrutiny, but the civitas element 
cannot be grasped in a purely scientific manner. This is exactly the something-
more-element of a city that can be universalized due to its direct references to 
presumed human nature . And this is the element which has always fascinated 
both urban scholars and political philosophers the most because  by grasping 
its nature they could formulate not only historical or sociological descriptions 
but also political prescriptions for their societies . Thinkers like Fustel, Weber, 
Mumford, and Lefebvre did not avoid overtly political engagement . They were 
dissatisfied with the outcomes of rapid industrialization and urbanization in the 
West, and it was one of the main incentives that triggered their interest in urban 
history . Appreciating cities from the past for being successful syntheses of urbs 
and civitas, they tried also to present a more universal and coherent image of 
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a ‘good’ city in its full . The historical examples they had previously examined 
(whether it was the ancient city-state or the mediaeval city-guild) became political 
arguments that this ideal is feasible and perhaps should be revived to avoid further 
degradation of their societies . This way, their political beliefs and goals became 
lenses through which one could look at the historical record to identify general 
trends and directions of city development and to present particular cities as 
better or worse manifestations of the assumed city ideal . It is, however, necessary 
to remember that the use of wider philosophical and political assumptions as 
methodological lenses has some inconveniences . They are condemned to be 
biased as they are themselves bound to the particular historical experiences of 
those who have constructed them . As summarized in Weber (1950: 318): ‘It is 
true that outside the western world there were cities in the sense of a fortified 
point and the seat of political and hierarchical administration, but outside the 
occident there have not been cities in the sense of unitary community’ .
In spite of voices demanding caution (Isin 2003), scholars still find it convenient 
to treat the development of cities west of the Elbe as the most significant spatial and 
temporal urban phenomenon . Consequently, they tend to examine urbanization 
and further industrialization in other regions of the world through the prism of 
lack – lack of a Roman past, lack of routes facilitating large-scale international 
trade, lack of Protestantism and its ethic promoting capitalism, even the lack 
of demographic perturbations caused by the Black Death in the 14th century . 
Paradoxically, there are also clandestine consequences of this attitude among 
scholars who are dissatisfied with it. They focus upon proving that on the most 
specific level of empirical studies the dividing line gets rather tenuous. Still, that 
means following the same pattern of reasoning, trying at best to show that we 
can find ideal-type cities outside Western Europe, so that at least the quantitative 
‘amount of the lack’ in other parts of Europe was not that great . The fact that 
more cities were built in Western Europe (see the map in Clark 2009: 38) and that 
Western-style urbanization and industrialization had a decisive impact on world 
history is beyond question . Nevertheless, the privileged position of ancient and 
mediaeval Western cities as ‘the most “beautiful” oeuvres of urban life’ (Lefebvre 
2000: 65) is more a political conclusion than a historical one .
The above remarks are not to question such an approach . Quite the contrary, 
appreciating the political potential of historical studies, I am convinced that we 
should follow in the footsteps of thinkers such as Weber and not avoid looking 
at urban history as a source of wisdom that can contribute to the justification or 
criticism of our own political choices . This is what I intend to do in this article, 
presenting what I would call a border experience of the city – the case of the 
16th-17th-century Poland . The relation between urbs and civitas is still an open 
question, and, since many new factors complicated its nature in the course of 
the last century, we are entitled not only to refer to the opinions of the classics 
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but also to revise them and to draw our own conclusions . The Polish ‘state-city’, 
peculiar as it may seem, may be worth mentioning for at least two reasons . First, 
it was an attempt to create a city in which the superiority of the civitas would not 
be limited to some commonly shared political ideology or occasionally performed 
rituals but would actually shape its constitutional design, setting conditions 
for everyday political practice . This way, it sets an interesting perspective 
that permits the assessment of the arguments of those who ‘still imagine a city 
made up not of townspeople, but of free citizens [ . . .], freely associated for the 
management of this community’ (Lefebvre 2000: 97) . Second, its proponents held 
rather strict views about cities they had observed in the West, which makes their 
observations relevant, as far as we are concerned, to formulate more balanced 
opinions concerning the assumed beauty of the European city .
Can Big Be Beautiful?
Small Is Beautiful, proclaimed Ernst F . Schumacher (1973) in the 70s of the 
last century . Proximity is often viewed as an important factor that strengthens 
interpersonal bonds and facilitates the establishment of strong and proud 
communities which their members can identify themselves with and thus 
support mutual cooperation, both political and economic . And so Pierre Manent 
in his Metamorphoses of the City writes: ‘The Greek city was the first form of 
human life to produce political energy . It was a deployment of human energy 
of unprecedented intensity and quality […] . Later history appears, in sum, as 
the ever-renewed quest for the political form that would permit the gathering 
of the energies of the city while escaping the fate of the city [ . . .]’ (Manent 2013: 
5) . Although for Fustel de Coulanges only ancient cities were to be perceived as 
being both urbs and civitas, his opinion in this respect does not seem to prevail 
among city historians . Many of them do their best to at least extend the validity 
of this peculiar combination, looking for some continuity between Greek poleis, 
Rome, and mediaeval or even contemporary cities . This is possible, so it seems, 
because contemporary interest in cities is to a large extent motivated by the 
assumption that the concept of civitas born in ancient urbs has been constantly 
affecting the direction of the cultural and political development of Europe . Its 
values and ideals, such as freedom, justice, cooperation, etc ., are claimed to form 
the core of European identity .
 It is true that the concept of the city as civitas was born in the reality of 
small Greek city-states, or even more precisely in Athens, the cradle of political 
philosophy . And it was reborn at the end of the Middle Ages, this time in the 
urban republics of Northern Italy mainly . Nevertheless, unlike the Greeks, who 
consequently viewed those not having polis as barbarians, Italian thinkers did not 
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identify civitas or respublica with urban political reality only . They were ‘thinking 
primarily of the city-state they knew’, but ‘they enlarged their definitions so as to 
include larger political units like the medieval kingdom or the empire’ (Dawson 
1961: 180) . And so, especially in the political literature of the Renaissance, the city 
(civitas) was emancipated from cities as such, and as a political project it supported 
the emancipation of nation-states aspiring to independence from the ideological 
and political domination of the Church . Often taking after Italian predecessors, 
writers all over Europe used the same political language borrowed from Aristotle 
and Cicero. Institutions, laws and the virtue of citizens, the political significance 
of individual behaviour and thus the role of education and wisdom, and the need 
for establishing balance between particular interests and the common good are the 
main themes whether one reads Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski’s prescriptions for the 
Polish government (De republica emendanda 1551) or learns about the sources 
of strength of the Commonwealth of England from Thomas Smith (De republica 
Anglorum 1583) or Venice Serenissima from Gasparo Contarini (De magistratibus 
et republica venetorum 1543) . Proportions differ, stress is put elsewhere, but the 
conviction that the state should be a collectively operating community in which 
every individual understands, and perceives as just, his social and political role 
is common to all of them . Perhaps Weber was right that the ‘ideal type’ of the 
European city was the mediaeval guild city, but the political spirit of civitas lasted 
in Europe much longer . Unfortunately, although it was able to keep its allure as a 
desirable political ideal in works of many political thinkers, the dominant historical 
practice proceeded along an alternative path for a long time . The eventual victory 
of nation-states resulted not only in conquering cities as such, but – as Maurizio 
Viroli (1992) points out – it changed the meaning of politics . From then on, the 
traditional language of politics, being so far the language of the city, functioned 
only on the margin of political philosophy . At the level of states, it was replaced 
by the language of reason of state according to which political activity is no more 
than a struggle for power . Cities survived, but merely as new economic resources 
and not proud communities any more . Thanks to subsequent industrialization, the 
urbs side of cities expanded far beyond traditional political imagination, but at the 
same time they ceased to be political forms ‘in which men govern themselves and 
know that they govern themselves’ (Manent 2013: 18) . With one decisive political 
shift, civitas was ousted from its natural residuum, a city, and new dynamic states 
refused to give it a shelter – except for Poland (from 1569, the Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth), where a unique political experiment was carried out at about 
this time . The experiment could be seen as a continuation and radicalization of 
the earlier European political practice that was just expiring in the West .
As Jerzy Topolski points out rightly, the tendency to oppose Western Europe 
and countries east of the Elbe River is perhaps attractive as it permits the 
production of many neat explanatory schemes, but being often contradictory they 
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only multiply confusion and on the whole do not make any progress in explaining 
true historical sources of the split (Topolski 1994: 342) . Perhaps a better option 
would be searching for some common backgrounds all across Europe, and only 
then looking for special causes and developments characteristic of the different 
regions . One of such commonalities are economic and social changes taking 
place in the last centuries of the Middle Ages, which were accompanying the 
developing market economy . Though generally the social living standards in the 
late mediaeval period, and especially of the wealthy townspeople, rose, the same 
was not true about the status of the nobility . The disparity between the growing 
needs of the nobles and their falling income was noticeable in almost all countries 
and demanded a countermeasure . This was all the more so since it was the nobility 
who claimed a leading political and cultural role in society, which was on its 
part redefined by the growing popularity of the model of the Renaissance man. 
Given the prevailing conditions of European economic growth, the only effective 
method for the nobility to regain its position was for it to develop the individual’s 
own direct economic activity, which is again a reaction that can be observed 
throughout Europe except for the Netherlands (Topolski 1994: 346) . At the same 
time, this common reaction of the nobility is for Topolski the crucial factor that 
triggered processes responsible for the further differentiation of Europe, the rising 
of a ‘new’ serfdom and manorial-serf economy in Central and Eastern Europe 
being one of their outcomes. Specific conditions of Poland – its agrarian character, 
good terms for the grain trade, and large quantity of nobility (the szlachta) – were 
in favour of this group . No wonder that the rise in economic and social status 
encouraged the szlachta to increase their political significance. It was facilitated, 
again, by particular historical circumstances which were to modify the impact 
of pan-European trends and events . All over Europe, the main opponent of the 
centralization of power and the establishment of a strong monarchy was the 
nobility . Nevertheless, while western monarchs relied upon towns as a means 
of reducing their dependence upon the landed aristocracy, Polish kings in their 
attempts to counterweight the power of the wealthiest nobles (the ‘European’ 
magnaci) had to rely on the provincial nobility, the ‘gentry’ (Wyczański 1982: 
97) . They were doing that with the help of various privileges, which are often 
incorrectly viewed as gradually weakening the monarchical power, while in the 
first place they improved the social and political position of the lesser nobility in 
respect to their much wealthier ‘brothers’ .
From its beginnings at the end of the 14th century, the realm of the Jagiellons was 
in fact an agglomeration of territories differing in political traditions, customs, 
laws, and populations, with the ruling dynasty as the only tangible embodiment 
of the political will which gave birth to the spectacular undertaking of the union 
between the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania . Only when this unifying element 
risked perishing because of Zygmunt August’s inability to beget an heir was 
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the new Act of Union signed in Lublin (1569), according to which two separate 
political organisms became one. The process of unification was long and never fully 
accomplished . Still, as the crucial political actors from both sides were interested 
in its lasting, it was important to construct and support some coherent political 
narration which would facilitate the building of a common political identity and 
a common political language . In general, this identity was in accordance with the 
concept of the ancient civitas, being perceived as a community of free and equal 
citizens who elect and control those who are to decide on the common good, 
including the king himself . Already in the 14th century, no king could come to 
office without the approval of the representatives of the nobility, and from 1573 
the concept of free election (electio viritim) was introduced, which meant the 
participation of the entirety of the nobility . Eventually, as the Sejm developed its 
own leadership and political movement (the so-called ‘executionist movement’), 
the middle gentry replaced the aristocracy as the key political decision maker . 
The growth of political awareness among the szlachta was accompanied by 
constitutional development, which in the course of time centred all power in 
the legislative assembly – the Sejm Walny (‘general gathering’), comprised of 
the ‘three estates’ (trzy stany sejmujące – the king,  senators, and deputies from 
the Sejm proper) . Besides privileges granting the nobility almost absolute power 
over the rest of the society, several documents laid the legal foundations for this 
domination . According to the Nihil novi act (1505), all new laws required the 
approval of the Sejm.  Even more significant were the Henrician Articles, meant 
as a social contract between the newly elected king, Henri de Valois, and the 
nobility (that is: all citizens) . Though the king abandoned the Polish throne to 
become the ruler of France as Henry III, the Articles survived . In essence, they 
formed a Bill of Rights as they included important obligations which were meant 
to bind every king thereafter . The last article granted the nobility the right to 
absolve itself from obedience to any king who had violated the agreement, which 
was in fact an invitation to legalized rebellion (Jedrych 1982: 88) . In a nutshell, 
the subsequent privileges and laws set the nobility in an extremely favourable 
economic, social, and political position unknown in other countries, supporting 
constitutional changes that eventually transformed Poland into a democracy of 
nobles . A detailed analysis of peculiarities embedded in the political system of 
the First Polish Republic would be superfluous here. All the more so, the recent 
‘republican turn’, as some call it, raised the interest in the Polish version of 
republicanism, and so the literature on the subject is vast and constantly growing 
(Fedorowicz 1982, Jedruch 1982, Lukowski 1991) . Instead, I would like to make 
use of my philosophical licence and underline one particular aspect of the 
nobles’ ideology, which is often overlooked . And that is because it is visible only 
when it is presented against the background of general European trends in the 
development of political thinking – such are the trends mentioned by Manent 
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and Viroli . Here is where the Polish rzeczpospolita (Latin respublica) can be 
presented as an experimental attempt to find a form suitable for ‘the gathering 
of the energies of the city while escaping the fate of the city’ on the largest scale 
then possible – the whole state .
A City without Cities
From the Middle Ages, the urban sector in Poland was relatively small, but at 
that time among countries with agrarian economy one can also count France, 
Germany, Austria, and Hungary (Allen 2000: 4) . The number of Polish cities is 
estimated at about 1,100 in the 14th and 1,750 in the middle of the 17th century 
(Herbst 1954: 7) . Only eight cities had more than ten thousand inhabitants, with 
Gdańsk (German Danzig) having in its prime over seventy thousand inhabitants 
(Cieślak, Biernat 1988: 92). On the scale of the whole country, the percentage of 
urban population did not exceed 20–25%, with some regional variations . Some 
sources seriously lower these data (Allen 2000) as final numbers depend on the 
calculation method . Traditionally, the most urbanized region of Poland was Great 
Poland (Wielkopolska, in the west), and the most notable were three cities of 
Royal Prussia (Gdańsk, Toruń, and Elbląg), for enjoying the greatest autonomy . 
Though the pace of urbanization was rather slow up to the mid-17th century, the 
cities in Poland had not markedly lagged in size or wealth behind the cities in 
the West . Quite similar were their internal development, the economic, social, 
and political conflicts between different social strata, or the religious revival 
during the Reformation (Bogucka–Samsonowicz 1986) . The situation changed 
dramatically in the second half of the 17th century . Reasons for that were plenty, 
and there is still disagreement between historians as to which ones of them are 
to be viewed as the most pivotal. Definitely, one of such important causes were 
consequences of the Swedish invasion (the Swedish deluge of the years 1655–
1660), during which more than one hundred cities were destroyed, and the whole 
country suffered serious political and economic problems . Nevertheless, it is also 
true that the fate of urbanization in Poland was at least partly sealed by political 
changes brought about by the rise of Polish parliamentarism at the turn of the 15th 
and 16th centuries and by the further democratization of the political system . For 
various reasons, cities did not fit into the general project of the Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, but the most interesting from a philosophical perspective are 
the arguments justifying reluctance to the urban reality .
Polish republicans deplored cities . The main object of their criticism was not, 
however, accidental. What they really resented was first of all one particular 
aspect of cities, namely their dependence on their economic status and thus the 
promotion of materialism among their citizens . For Polish political thinkers, 
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such focus on triggering the development of the urbs side of urban communities 
worked against their attempts to become civitate . And so cities were criticized 
for both aesthetic and ethical reasons (Bogucka 2009) . The primacy of egoistic 
motivations was accused of causing damages in the public sphere . That is why, 
it was claimed that big cities all over Europe were dirty and smelly, they were 
overcrowded, and in their search for utility they became inimical to beauty . 
No laudatio urbis can one find in early modern Polish literature. And the only 
known essay on a Polish city – the Description of Warsaw by Adam Jarzębski (the 
middle of the 17th century) – praises not the urban reality of the city but the great 
houses and palaces of the nobles, which bring some greater culture to it and thus 
deter total disintegration .
Ethics, according to Polish writers, does not live in a city, either . Since self-
interest is a centrifugal force, it does not foster republicanism . In fact, egoism 
percolates through the public sphere, and, instead of strengthening a good 
republican government, the political system drives towards oligarchy . Even 
Venice, perceived as the best European model of government up to the middle 
of the 17th century, was treated with some dose of suspicion in this respect 
(Grzybowski 1994) . And yet, in spite of all the criticism against urbanization, 
in one of the works of Polish historian and 16th-century nobleman Stanisław 
Sarnicki, one can read: ‘not many cities they have built in Poland, but with one 
city so notable, so fortified, so ordered – they [the ancestors] granted us [...]. The 
one in which the king is a mayor, and the whole nobility is a city council, so they 
are all, together with the Crown, urbanites’ (Zarębska 1986: 271).
It would be wrong to see in the above words just a slick analogy . They expressed 
a belief common among Polish political thinkers that the Polish–Lithuanian 
Commonwealth had much more in common with European cities than with big 
European nation-states . And it has to be remembered that we are talking about 
the biggest country of Europe (except Russia), covering at its peak in the early 17th 
century almost a million square kilometres; and the biggest body of citizens, as 
the Polish nobility was the most numerous in Europe . To think about such a large 
area as similar to cities required a great dose of imagination . Trying to turn it into 
a city required courage and favourable historical conditions, that is to say: a lot 
of luck . And so the political turn Poland took in the Renaissance, with its further 
successes and failures, was the outcome of all that .
Although points such as political imagination and courage in making political 
choices are much more interesting for a political philosopher, a few remarks 
should be made on more objective factors that contributed to the undertaking . 
One of such factors was the Reformation, all the more so it coincided in time with 
the coming of age of the parliamentary system .
In Poland, and even more in Lithuania with its large Eastern Orthodox 
population, Christianity was already multi-denominational long before the start 
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of the Reformation (Tazbir 1994: 168) . More than a movement for the radical 
reform of the Church, the latter was perceived rather as an interesting foreign 
ideology which could serve as a means of exerting pressure on the Catholic clergy 
(id .: 178) . Luther’s ideas reached Poland very quickly, and they found fertile soil 
especially in the cities of Pomorze (Pomerania) and Wielkopolska . However, it 
was not Luther’s Church which was to prevail . Burghers in Poland were for the 
greater part of German origin; so, for them, Lutheranism was more natural – all the 
more so as German immigration rose during the 30 Years’ War . Still, the nobility 
had their reasons to choose Calvinism instead . Lutheranism was perceived as 
a supporting absolutism, while Calvin’s ideas could be applied, if correctly 
interpreted, as a weapon to fight both the king’s prerogatives and the rights of 
the Roman Church . And in this role they were used, causing Calvin himself 
to criticize Poles for not paying enough attention to theological issues (Małłek 
2012) . The superiority of political over religious goals had paradoxical effects . 
It encouraged quick proliferation of new ideas (quite soon Protestant deputies 
dominated in the parliament), but strictly religious debates were fragmented and 
shallow in spite of all the efforts of figures like Jan Łaski, who was one of not so 
many converts interested and trained in theology . In effect, Polish Protestantism 
started with serious religious claims – like the proposal to cut the bonds with 
Rome and to create a national Protestant church of Poland – but gave them up 
rather quickly . The climax of the Polish Reformation was reached in 1570 with 
the Sandomierz Agreement in which a number of Protestant groups (without the 
most radical movement of the Polish Brethren) agreed on mutual tolerance . The 
idea was supported even by many non-Protestants, including Jakub Uchański, the 
Archbishop of Gniezno and the Primate of Poland . And so the document was later 
incorporated into the Henrician Articles, thus becoming a kind of constitutional 
provision . This peak of famous Polish toleration was, however, the forecast of 
its decline. After achieving a legal confirmation of the superiority of the noble 
nation against the king and the Church, Polish nobles were more than happy to 
re-convert to Catholicism . Although for the next hundred years Poland was to be 
called ‘a place of shelter for heretics’ or ‘a state without stakes’ (Tazbir 2000), the 
number of Protestants dropped significantly on the political scene already in the 
70s of the 16th century (Małłek 2012).
One of the less obvious but significant effects of the Reformation was an 
important change in the educational curriculum of the Polish nobility . Despite 
its medieval renown, the University of Cracow no longer satisfied the taste of 
the youth as it was too much devoted to the Pope and at the same time hostile 
to republican ideas . Therefore, the need for intellectual freshness drove young 
noblemen abroad . Protestants initially chose Wittenberg, Leipzig, or Basel, but 
the University of Padua soon became the most attractive place for Catholics, not 
without regard for the proximity of the increasingly appreciated Venice .
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Exaggerating a bit, Stanisław Windakiewicz claims that this popularity of 
Padua put a stop to the former Florentine influences, paving their ways into 
Poland via the royal court at the turn of the 16th century (Grzybowski 1994: 19) . 
Falling under the spell of the Serenissima, the new noble élites started to dream 
about turning Poland into the new Rome and so exceeding Venice in fulfilling 
republican ideals . In spite of its inspiring political theory, Venice seemed not to 
have been radical enough in unifying all individual efforts around the common 
good . And the reason for that was exactly its urban character with all its vices . 
The Polish republic was to correct this imperfection, referring directly to the 
Ciceronian ideal of the virtuous citizen .
Reconstructing the concept of civitas on the state level did not mean at all 
staying true to the more and more outdated language of politics . Polish thinkers 
were more than happy to adopt the language of raggione di stato . Nevertheless, 
answering the question as to who had an ear so sensitive and an arm so strong 
as to hear and then to execute demands of the reason of state, they pointed at 
the nobility – or, even more precisely: at every member of the group, regardless 
of his property, his social status, his education, and so on . All such individual 
differences were perceived as secondary and deprived of any serious political 
significance. That was to be the main difference between ordinary cities, including 
city-states, and the big Polish state-city . The latter was to become a pure civitas 
whose functioning would remain unblemished by any private interests . Even 
the very word ‘private’ served as a serious insult in Polish political discourse . 
It was believed that freedom and equality are values necessary to improve the 
quality of one’s life, which led to the conclusion that every individual should 
naturally seek ways to enjoy them . In effect, every individual was expected to 
develop civic virtues as a natural competence that simply ameliorates one’s life . 
And so the idea to create an institutional system which would offer freedom and 
equality as the most attractive social and political rewards for acting on behalf of 
the common good might indeed look convincing as strengthening both freedom 
and cooperation . In fact, this idea has been percolating through the whole body of 
republican literature from antiquity up to our times as it serves well the purposes 
of the theory, vouching for its coherence . Rarely, however, was it brought to 
such an extreme, literally becoming the source of constitutional practice, with 
inventions so unique as the liberum veto custom (‘I do not allow’ shouted by a 
noble present at the parliamentary session nullified any legislation).
Binding the difference between urbs and civitas to the forms of human activity, 
it is possible to see here the difference between ‘using’ and ‘creating’ the city . The 
urbs is the object of the activity motivated first of all by personal interests. And so 
it is a city which is viewed by its citizens as an opportunity, a tool which is to be 
used to achieve their own particular goals, such as wealth or social prestige, taking 
advantage of one’s social, economic, or political position . The need for civitas is 
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born out of recognizing the benefits of joining one’s actions to those of others. 
And though perhaps, at first, individual motives for doing so are equally egoistic, 
requirements of cooperation – institutions and laws but also public accountability 
for one’s actions – are factors which facilitate the rise of some common political 
awareness and sense of community . Even if we assume the egoistic, unsocial 
nature of each individual to be a fact, under favourable circumstances, this nature 
does not have to be hostile to undertakings which are able to unite efforts of the 
citizens, as not only philosophers but also historical practice observed in many 
cities proved . What seemed to be the key to their success was balance between 
urbs and civitas, with its many aspects described already by Aristotle: the balance 
between material and spiritual needs, richness and freedom, differences and 
unity, private and common, or economy and politics .
Polish republicans (with few important exceptions such as Andrzej Wolan 
or Andrzej Frycz-Modrzewski) paid little attention to specify conditions under 
which such balance could be achieved . Believing in the superiority of the civitas 
aspect of their state-city, they seemed to have assumed that the strength of the 
urbs-Poland should emerge automatically . This initial oversight of the fact that 
it is much easier to create a civitas in a wealthier urbs was perhaps due to the 
fact that in the 14th century Poland entered an economic and demographic 
upswing which persisted into the 16th century (Bideleux–Jeffries 1998: 129) . It 
was expected that this prosperity would survive much longer . Nevertheless, the 
economic situation was worsening in the course of the 17th century, and by the end 
of the First Republic nearly half of the gentry did not own land and had to earn 
their living through public service (in the army, the judiciary, or in administrative 
positions) as, according to the above mentioned Nihil Novi act, the szlachta was 
barred from engaging in city commerce . Being enfranchised and feeling equal to 
the rich magnates, later on, that so-called szlachta-gołota contributed heavily to 
the corruption of the political system as they became puppets in the hands of 
their more powerful colleagues and foreign courts . Nevertheless, even when the 
economic backwardness of the country was noticed and voices demanding social, 
economic, and political reforms were raised, they were usually supported by a 
very specific narrative. According to this narrative, it was much more important 
to remind the nobility about their political and ethical duties than to introduce 
concrete legal and institutional solutions which would be able to force particular 
behaviours. Of course, the political significance of this ideological bias cannot 
be overestimated, but it does deserve attention from a wider philosophical 
perspective . It shows that Polish republicanism put great trust in the individual, 
expecting that, being granted citizenship, he would feel motivated to take part in 
the civitas of his own will and thus would develop virtues necessary to establish 
the balance between urbs and civitas – in his life and in the life of the whole 
community . Consequently, the constitutional framework of the Commonwealth 
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was viewed as a tool to activate this individual potential of freedom rather than a 
system of fences to direct it as, for instance, Thomas Hobbes would have wanted 
it . It was believed that once individuals become virtuous citizens, their virtue 
would guarantee that their actions would take into account not only their own 
particular interests but also the good of their civitas . Such a radical choice of the 
republican political practice to bind the condition of the whole community with 
qualities of its citizens heavily influenced the development of Polish political 
culture . In the 18th century, when anarchy in the Commonwealth was so obvious 
that there was no point in denying the need for deep constitutional reform, even 
radical proposals in this respect were usually mitigated by the argument that ‘every 
form of government is good [ . . .] when people are good’, as an anonymous author 
of the only known Polish booklet (moderately) advancing French absolutism 
concluded . And so the Polish experiment to create a city which would be more 
beautiful than other cities thanks to suppressing the urbs side of the community 
and expanding its political civitas side was caught in a vicious circle . To suit 
theoretical assumptions, this project was deprived of the political energy coming 
from competing interests although, as Fedorowicz concludes summarizing the 
noble hegemony: ‘In any healthy society, competing loci of power and influence 
tend to balance each other in a creative tension which offers that society the 
opportunity of flexible response to any crisis’ (Fedorowicz 1982: 148). At the same 
time, the Polish state-city was deprived of the energy coming from the civitas 
itself as the emphasis put on the individual virtue made it impossible to enforce 
obedience to the common good via institutions and laws . In short, the produced 
noble civitas, which in theory was to embody the ideal of a good city, became 
merely a screen for private interests of the nobility . It was no accident that, as 
observed by Zamoyski, the less the nobility participated in the government, the 
more indispensable they believed themselves to be (Bideleux–Jeffries 1998: 146) .
Conclusions
There is an extremely interesting 16th-century essay which refers to exactly the 
same issues as the ones mentioned in the first, more philosophical section of this 
article, and then I discussed these issues with references to the history of the 
Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. It confirms my deep conviction that indeed, 
as Cicero claimed, historia magistra vitae est – not because it is repeating itself 
but because we are condemned to repeat the same political lessons all over again . 
The essay I have in mind was born out of a careful observation of Renaissance 
city life in Italy and an active participation in Polish political life . The work, 
titled The Conversation of a Pole with an Italian, was written by Łukasz Górnicki, 
a minor burgher from the town of Oświęcim, then appointed at the court. In the 
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dialogue, which compares the levels of freedom being enjoyed by Polish citizens 
and Italian ones, Górnicki includes many references to cities . Both the Italian, 
probably some Venetian merchant, and the Pole, a member of the nobility, notice 
very quickly that there is one huge difference in their view of possible sources of 
corruption of the civitas . For the Italian, the greatest dangers are brought about 
by those who are idle and poor but audacious, while for the Pole much worse 
are citizens who are rich and mind their business quietly . And so they both soon 
realize that one of the main objects of disagreement is the perception and the 
function of urbēs . For the Italian, there is no civitas without the strong urbs . For 
the Pole, urbanites always seem to threaten the political community . And yet 
there is a characteristic passage in which both the Italian and the Pole become a 
bit confused . It starts with the suggestion by the former that if the nobility lived 
in cities then it would be easier to check up on their civic virtue as cities are 
small enough to take account of every individual . The Pole seems to follow the 
reasoning, adding that indeed it is easier to care for virtue and good mores in 
small communities, but he suddenly draws back noticing that freedom suffers 
in such communities . It suffers, he claims, as the attention of the individual is 
focused upon his personal benefits, while it should rather encourage serving the 
whole political community . The Italian rejects Polish reservations and reiterates 
his argument referring to Gdańsk and its conflict with the Polish king, Stephen 
Báthory . Still, he cannot avoid the binding political decisions that have been 
made in the name of protecting the freedoms of the Gdańsk civitas against the 
king (the city gave its backing to Maximilian Habsburg during the ‘dual’ election 
of 1576) with the particular interests of the Gdańskers. Again, urbs and civitas 
seem to be two important aspects of the city but not so easy to be reconciled in 
practice . If we keep in mind that the dialogue was written by one person, it is not 
hard to come to the conclusion that Górnicki’s contemporaries were quite acute 
in observing these difficulties and the possible consequences of diminishing 
either element of the city .
The experiment to recapture the energy of the city on the state level did not 
end up well, but it deserves attention as an extreme political answer to historical 
processes which are claimed to be responsible for having eventually destroyed the 
essence of the European city and producing in many historians and philosophers 
the ‘feeling of shortcoming or loss’ (Manent 2013: 18) . In Polish republicanism, 
one can find a bold defence of the public sphere and a rather unique combination 
of individualism and collectivism . On the other hand, the eventual failure of the 
state-city project may be seen as a warning against all-too-quick extrapolation 
of ideas that we might want to adapt to our times . That is why, it may still be 
instructive since its fate suggests caution in treating economic development 
rooted in egoistic motivations as a threat to the sense of community as well as in 
seeing that development as an automatic gateway to producing it . In both cases, 
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the accompanying political appreciation of either civitas or urbs risks becoming 
merely an ideology and not a politically valid philosophy of the city .
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